Communications muddle involving Green

Usage examples of messages.

Impressive was not just the volume of messages intercepted but also the wide range of countries whose secrets could be read.

All analysts could do was sit and listen to the hopeless messages from the rebel soldiers fighting on the beach and their supporters throughout Cuba.

How it skillfully decoded more than 10,000 messages from nearly two dozen nations, including those in difficult Japanese diplomatic code.

How it played the key role in deciphering messages to and from the delegates to the post-World War I disarmament talks, thus giving the American delegation the inside track.

And some locked vault might also contain reams of intercepted and decoded Russian messages, which would offer enormous insight into Soviet military and political intentions after the war.

Language Branch scanned more than 1 million decrypted messages and, of those, forwarded approximately 415,000 translations.

Soviet messages, sent between Moscow and Washington, had been acquired from Western Union and other commercial telegraph companies.

By the summer of 1945 the average number of daily messages had grown to 289,802, from only 46,865 in February 1943.

San Francisco Conference, for example, American codebreakers were reading messages sent to and from the French delegation, which was using the Hagelin M-209, a complex six-wheel cipher machine broken by the Army Security Agency during the war.

Russian Fish machine by TICOM at the end of the war, and the ability to read a variety of diplomatic, KGB, and trade messages as a result of the Venona breakthrough on Soviet onetime pads, American codebreakers had been astonishingly lucky.

In all, they had collected a paltry two hundred messages, and none of those had been processed.

Buried in stacks of intercepted Soviet traffic as far back as February were messages pointing to large shipments of medical supplies going from Russia to Korea.

Other messages, about the same time, revealed a sudden and dramatic switch toward targets in South Korea by Soviet radio direction-finding units.

Soon, new messages were arriving hourly and lights were burning around the clock.

NSA presence, Miami Base could neither receive nor send superfast emergency CRITIC messages should the invasion run into serious problems.