Gives the go-ahead for punishments

Usage examples of sanctions.

The key difference between the policy of deter rence and that of containment in the Iraq context is that deterrence would effectively give up on both inspections and sanctions and allow Saddam to build WMD, counting on the military power of the United States--and, ultimately, our own nuclear arsenal--to deter him from new aggressions.

For example, the secondary sanctions could trigger the immediate seizure of all assets of any company caught buying smuggled Iraqi oil or paying the Iraqi surcharge.

The proposed secondary sanctions for Iraq would be far tougher, applied automatically, and without possibility of a waiver.

United States in the WTO, and they would likely win it easily--and we might face multilateral sanctions in return.

In addition, this approach to revising sanctions overlooks the considerable political influence Baghdad now wields as a result of its deliberate manipulation of oil-for-food contracts and smuggling to reward its advocates.

Until some other country was willing to furnish Jordan with the cheap oil and major import market its economy required, the Security Council was not going to enforce the sanctions against Amman for fear of wreaking havoc in the Hashimite Kingdom.

These secondary sanctions would have to be truly draconian to drive up the costs of smuggling so high that no oil company or arms maker, nor any country with such industries, would want to take the risk of being caught.

Then there would be the costs of lost trade as a result of either retaliations for the secondary sanctions or similar unfair trade practices by other countries, which would use our actions to justify their own.

On top of these financial costs, we would also face the diplomatic costs of fighting with our trade partners over the secondary sanctions, fighting constantly in the Security Council over Washington usurping the prerogatives of the United Nations, and resisting French, Russian, and Chinese efforts to make us pay a price for our unilateralism.

The United States could build a new containment regime centered on a set of punishing secondary sanctions that imposed real costs on those who buy Iraqi oil illegally and sell Baghdad prohibited military and dual-use items.

They publicly say that they recognize the need for the military sanctions, but their actions often speak otherwise.

Clinton administrations, when Iraq was weak and the sanctions were strong, there was little evidence that regionalists could use to make a case.

The hawks, led by Indyk and Parris, countered that the United States could hold the line for as long as it wanted if the administration was willing to make Iraq a priority and push back hard whenever Iraq or one of its advocates challenged the sanctions, inspections, or other elements of containment.

Because these secondary sanctions would be so draconian, every time the United States intelligence community found a country guilty of smuggling with Iraq, its advocates within the U.

Iraq had met all of the conditions in the resolution, whereas most states interpreted the same paragraph to mean that the sanctions would be lifted when Iraq had fulfilled only the terms of the disarmament clauses.